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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL SPENCER, ) 
Plain tiff and Appellant 
SANTA FE TR~;~ T~ANSPORTA- ~ 
TION CO., a Corporation and 
LEONARD RUSHING, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
6654 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The physical facts were as follows: 
Plaintiff was injured ·when an automobile driven 
by Rose Sorenson collided with the automobile in which 
the plaintiff was riding. The accident occurred on U. S. 
Highway 89, betwen Redmond and Gunnison, Utah, ap-
proximately one m.ile and a half south of the Gunnison 
Sugar Factory. The time was Sunday, November 15, 
1942, at approximately 6:45 p. m. 
At the place where the accident occurred the road 
had a hard surface and was divided by a yellow line into 
two lanes, approximately nine feet wide. The road was 
straight and wet and was partially covered with slush. 
This much is admitted. The plaintiff's and the defend-
ants' evidence differed as to how the accident occurred. 
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The difference consisted in plaintiff's evidence which 
showed that the bus, while travelling north on the afore-
said highway at the time and place alleged, sideswiped an 
automobile, driven by Rose Sorenson, which was travel-
ing in the opposite directi·on, causing said automobile to 
careen out of control onto the side of the road on which 
the automobile, in which plaintiff was riding as a pass-
enger, was traveling. As a result, the Sorenson car 
crashed into the car in which plaintiff was riding and 
plaintiff sustained the seri·ous and permanent injuries 
complained of. The defendants' version of the accident 
differs principally in the fact that they deny that the 
bus struck the Sorens;on car. They claim to know 
nothing about what happened. However, they do admit 
tliat the bus was in the exact location of the accident at 
the approximate time the injuries complained of OC· 
curred. 
PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff's evidence in chief consisted of the 
testimony of four witnesses who were riding in the 
Sorenson car proceeding south on highway 89, toward 
Redmond, Utah, and of the testimony of the plaintiff 
and Maxine Anderson, who was the driver of the car 
in which plaintiff was riding. 
The four witnesses who were riding in the Sorenson 
car told substantially the same story. (It is undenied 
except on one point. The defendants deny that the Santa 
Fe bus struck the Sorenson car).) They were all 
employees at the Turkey Plant in Gunnison. On Novem-
ber 15, 1943, at approximately 6:30 p. m. they left the 
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Turkey Plant in Rose Sorenson's aut01nobile and pro-
rt>t-ded southward toward their hon1es in Redmond. It 
was dusk and the road was wet and partially covered 
with slush. Rose Sorenson was driving. En1ma Jensen 
was sitting next to her in the front seat, and Ina Soren-
son and Cleone Jensen "\Vere sitting together in the back 
seat. \Vhen the Sorenson car approached the vicinity 
where the collision later occurred, the four women in 
the car observed the defendants' bus proceeding toward 
them on the highway. \Vhen they first observed the 
bus it was crowding the n1iddle of the r·oad and as it 
approached nearer they observed that it was over the 
middle line and on their side of the road. Rose Sorenson, 
who ·was driving the car, thereupon drove the car off the 
paved portion of the highway about two feet onto the 
shoulder of the road. (R. 122) At this time, her car was 
still in n1otion. As the bus approached nearer, she ob-
served the rear portion of it suddenly slide, so that it 
struck the front left portion of her car and knocked her 
semi-conscious. (R. 112) The other three witnesses 
in the car then observed that the Sorenson car careened 
and slid over onto the portion of road reserved for north-
bound traffic. At this same time, the car in which the 
plaintiff was riding as a passenger was proceeding north-
erly about one-half a block behind the bus. The Soren-
son car, while out of contr·ol, ran into the car in which 
plaintiff was riding, and as a proxin1ate result, the 
plaintiff sustained the injuries complained of. 
After the plaintiff had been taken out of the car, 
and after both cars had ben emptied of all occupants, a 
milk truck, traveling in a northerly direction, ran into the 
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car in which plaintiff had been riding. It thus appears 
from plaintiff's testimony that there had ben three 
separate collisions ·on the highway at the time and place 
where plaintiff sustained her injuries. This is also 
admitted. 
It appeared that imn1ediately after the Sorenson car 
had collided with the car in which plaintiff was riding, 
that Rose Sorenson had explained her presence on the 
wrong side of the road by stating that she had been 
struck by the Santa Fe bus. 
Maxine Anderson, who was the driver ·of the car 
in which plaintiff was riding, testified in behalf of the 
plaintiff. Her story was substantially the same as that 
told by the plaintiff with reference to the events occur~ 
ring inrmediately before and at the scene of the acci~ 
dent. 
They testified that they had been to Richfield to visit 
the parents of Maxine Anderson. On their return trip 
to Manti they passed through Redmond. While passing 
through Redmond they observed ·on the side of the road 
an abandoned Santa Fe bus. As they proceeded north-
ward toward A very Beck's place, which was where the 
accident subsequently occurred, a Santa Fe bus passed 
them going in the same direction. This bus passed them 
while they were on an '' S'' curve, which is approximately 
one-half to three-fourths of a mile south of Avery Beck's. 
When the bus passed, they observed that it was going 
about 35 miles an hour, which was approximately 5 miles 
an hour faster than they were traveling. 
At the time the bus passed the two girls, they were 
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listeninp; on the radio to the ''Inner Sanctum'' program, 
which cmne on the air Sunday evenings at that time, 
at 6:30 p. m. It was, therefore, sometime between 6:30 
and 7:00 o'clock when the bus passed the automobile in 
which the plaintiff was riding. 
After the bus passed the car in which plaintiff was 
riding, the hvo girls observed it proceed northerly on U. 
S. Highway 89 to·ward A very Beck's place. They noticed 
nothing unusual about the bus. They remembered seeing 
the rear clearance lights as the bus proceeded ahead 
of then1. \Yhen the bus was approximately one-half a 
block in front of the car in which the two girls were 
riding, and a short ristance north of Avery Beck's resi-
dence, the two girls noticed the flash ·of lights from 
another car coming in the opposite direction. These lights 
came onto the side of the road on which plaintiff and 
:Maxine Anderson were traveling. (R. 249) Immediately 
thereafter, this car continued toward them in its travel 
until it crashed into Maxine Anderson's car. When this 
happened, the plaintiff was thrown violently against 
the windshield and was rendered unconscious. She was 
unable to tell anything further regarding the accident. 
Maxine Anderson said that immediately after the 
accident she observed the plaintiff jammed between the 
dashboard and the seat. (R. 227) She was unconscious 
and was bleeding very profusely around the face. Miss 
Anderson, who is a trained nurse, explained that plain-
tiff had ·an artery cut over her ear, and was bleeding 
badly over her entire face. Her leg was also cut and 
bleeding. It appeared that her upper teeth were broken 
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and those in her lower jaw were loosened. They suc-
ceeded in taking plaintiff out of the car and removing 
her to the home of Avery Beck. (R. 229) 
After plaintiff had been removed, a collission oc-
curred when a milk truck, traveling north, struck the 
Anderson automobile. 
Miss Anderson related that the four people who were 
in the Sorenson car all appeared to be dazed. She said 
that she was a little cross with Rose Sorenson and asked 
her what she was doing on her side of the road. Miss 
Sorenson said, "My God, the bus hit me, I couldn't help 
it " (R. 229) 
The plaintiff then related, in detail, the nature of her 
injuries. She explained dhat she had multiple cuts on 
her face and leg, and then pointed them out in detail to 
the jury. It appeared that some of these cuts, particu-
larly near her left ear and chin, had left permanent dis-
figuring scars. (R. 251) It also appeared that as a 
proximate result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to 
her chin and jaw. The plaintiff had been compelled to 
have two upper teeth extracted, and a removable bridge 
inserted. She also had to have two lower teeth extracted 
and a removable ,bridge placed therein. (R. 253) It also 
appeared that plaintiff had ben confined to her bed for 
approximately a week, and that she had suffered severe 
headaches and pain as a result of her injuries. As a 
result of the two removable bridges, plaintiff spoke with 
a distinct lisp, particularly when making the aspirate 
sounds. The record does not reveal the age of the plain-
tiff, but no one will question the fact that she is a young 
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girl in her 20's.The reeord does reveal that at the time 
of her injuries, she was mnployed in Sanpete County, 
as a publie social worker. 
Dr. Hunter, a local dentist, was called to testify in 
behalf of the plaintiff in regards to the work done to 
plaintiff's n10uth and teeth, and the reasonable expense 
of the san1e. 
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY 
The defendants, in their evidence, disputed only one 
fact. They adn1itted that their bus was in the vicinity 
of the place where plaintiff was injured, at approximate-
ly the time the injuries <QCcurred, and they did not dis-
pute the fact that the Sorenson car had run into the car 
in which the plaintiff had been riding, nor did they dis-
pute the fact that a n1ilk truck had collided with the car 
in ·which plaintiff was riding. They did, however, deny 
that their bus had struck the Rose Sorenson car. 
In an attempt to establish that the bus had not struck 
the car driven by Rose Sorenson, the defendants .called 
the defendant, Leonard Rushing, who was the bus driver. 
He testified that on November 15, at approximately 6:30 
p.m., he was in the vicinity where the accident occurred. 
He, however, stated that he knew nothing of the accident 
and was unaware of any noise or bumping which would 
apprise him of the fact that his bus had collided with 
any object. He did admit, however, that the passengers 
on his bus, destined for Salt Lake City, left the bus at 
Santaquin and completed the trip in another bus. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
bus which he had ben driving was returned to Phoenix, 
(this bus ordinarily traveled directly to Salt Lake City. 
The reason for changing passengers at Santaquin and 
retunning to Phoenix without going to Salt Lake City 
was unexplained. This was especially peculiar in view of 
the fact that the defendant claimed that the bus had 
been undamaged.) 
The only car that the defendant Rushing remem-
bered passing was a truck just outside of Redmond. This 
truck, he observed, resembled a cattle truck and had 
dual wheels. ( R. 250) He also explained that the bus 
which he was driving is about 39 feet long and carries 
35 passengers. When the bus is empty it weighs ap-
proximately 11 or 12 tons. (R. 353) On cross exam-
ination, the witness Rushing admitted that his bus was 
8 feet wide and that when he was driving in one lane, 
there was only 6 inches clearing on each side. (R. 367) 
The witness stated that between Redmond and Gunni-
son he was traveling about 35 miles an hour. When he 
was about one mile and a half north of Redmond he 
passed the truck referred to. The truck which he passed 
was traveling about 20 or 25 miles an hour. (R. 376) The 
witness also admitted that his bus was the only bus of 
any kind that runs between Redmond and Gunnison be-
tween 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening. (R. 377) (It is 
approximately 10 to 13 miles from Redmond to Avery 
Beck's place where the accident occurred.) (R. 371) 
Defendant called as :a witness, Roscoe Tolstrup, 
who testified that he was the town marshall at Gunni-
son. On the 15th day of November, he was called to 
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Avery Beck's place which is ,over a 1nile and 6/10 south 
of the sugar factory. HP recPived the call at approxi-
mately 7 :00 o 'dock in the evening. 
On cross exmnination :Mr. rrolstrup stated that when 
he arrived at the scene of the accident, the milk truck 
which had subsequently struck the two cars had left. 
He therefore stated that he could tell nothing about 
what darnage was done by this nrilk truck. (T. 387) 
G. \Y. Sorenson was called as a witness for the 
defendants and testified that he is an autom~o,bile dealer 
at Centerfield, Utah. He stated that he towed a 1937 
Chevrolet sedan from A very Beck's place on the 15th of 
N ove1nber. On cross examination, the witness admitted 
that the pictures shown by Exhibits 3 and 4 did not 
reflect the true condition of the car as shown on Nov-
ember 15, (R. 395) and he stated that his mechanic 
turned the left front fender of the Chevrolet automobile 
over to Mr. Wilkinson some time subsequent to Novem-
ber 15, 1942. 
Defendants called H. Leon Embly, highway patrol-
man, as a witness. He was called to the scene of the acci-
dent at approximately 7:30 p. m. and arrived there ap-
proximately ten minutes later. (R. 398) He went into 
the Beck residence where he saw the injured person, 
and had some discussion with Cleone Jensen, which 
discussion his counsel did not permit him to relate. (R. 
399) The witness stated that the Plymouth car was 
smashed in front and also along the left side. The wit-
ness also stated that he called highway patrolman head-
quarters in Salt Lake City and asked them to check the 
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Santa Fe bus which was coming into Salt Lake City 
that night. Salt Lake City subsequently called Mr. 
Embly back and told him that the bus had turned around 
at Santaquin and had not come to Salt Lake City as 
scheduled. (\Vhy did not the bus come to Salt Lake City~r 
On the night of the 16th the witness stopped the north 
bound bus in Gunnison and made an observation to 
determine if any dan1age had been made to the left rear 
part of the bus. He did not observe any. The witness 
thought that the bus he had examined on the night of the 
16th was either No. 388 or No. 387. He was not sure. 
(R. 406) (The bus which the defendant Rushing said 
he was driving on the night of the accident was No. 392.) 
(R. 358) The witness also checked the southbound bus 
on the 17th day of November, driven by Mel Rushing. 
There was no evidence of damage on this bus. He also 
examined the north bound bus and south bound bus on the 
17th day of November. There was no damage on these 
buses. (R. 407) He did not know the number of these 
buses. (Note that there is no evidence from witness 
Embly that he ever examined bus No. 392, which was the 
bus driven by Leonard Rushing on the night of the acci-
dent.) He examined a bus driven by Leonard Rushing 
on Highway 28 on the evening of November 18th. This 
was about 4 miles south of Levan. He found no damage 
on this bus. (R. 409) The witness admitted that north 
of the po,int where the Maxine Anderson and Sorenson 
car collided there were tire marks going onto the west 
shoulder of the road. (This corroborates the testimony 
of the women in the Sorenson car to the effect that they 
drove off the highway onto the west shoulder to avoid 
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bPing struck by the Santa Fe bus.) The witness testi-
fied that in the conversations he had with the plaintiff 
and Maxine Anderson subsequent to the collision on 
NoYeinber 15, tlw two g-irls had not said anything about 
the Santa Fe bus passing then1. (R. 413, and following-.) 
On cross exan1ination the witness ad1nitted that he 
had Ina de no nwnwrandun1 regarding- the conversation 
he had allegedly had ·with the plaintiff and Maxine 
Anderson, and that he also had taken no measurements 
at the scene of the accident. (R. 419-21) He stated that 
the milk truck which had hit the two cars after the first 
accident, was an International ton and a half truck with 
a rack body and a flat bed. (R. 423) As part of the 
cross examination of the ·witness, plaintiff introduced 
Exhibit B which consisted of notes taken by the witness 
innnediately subsequent to his investigatilon at the scene 
of the accident. (R. 437, and following) The exhibit 
indicated that Cleone Jensen stated that on the night 
of the accident the Sorenson car and bus had col-
lided and that Rose Sorenson said the bus struck 
her car. His notes also showed that the bus was due at 
Gunnison at 6 :27 and arrived at GunniSton at 6 :45 on 
November 15. (R. 442) 
The witness admitted on cross examination that he 
never put any direct questions to Pearl Spencer as to 
whether or not she had seen the bus on the night of the 
collision. (R. 447) In fact he admited that Pearl Spen-
cer had never stated anything to him regarding the bus. 
(R. 448) The witness also admitted ·on cross examinaion 
that when there is a three car collision, it is very difficult 
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to detennine how specific dmnage has been caused. (R. 
449) 
· The defendant then called as witnesses Cleta Cher-
rington, Leah Cherrington, Mrs. Harold B. Fulmer, Mrs. 
Vera Procter and Mrs. Alice Bolton. These witnesses 
all stated that they were passengers on the Santa Fe 
bus at the time that plaintiff sustained her injuries. They 
all stated that it was a stormy night and that the bus 
was crowded and that none of them heard or felt any 
impact or collision at any time during the trip from 
Redmond to Gunnison. After this evidence had been 
introduced the defendants rested. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
The plaintiff called on rebuttal Mr. Royal Whit-
lock. Mr. Whitlock had been subpoened from Gunnison 
for the defendants, but had not been called by the defend-
ants as a witness. In fact, he was mysteriously excused 
and directed to return to his home the night before the 
defendants introduced evidence on rebuttal. It was nec-
essary for the defendants to subpoena him in Gunnison 
in order for him to re-appear as a witness. (R. 543) 
The witness testified that on the night of the collision 
he and another person were traveling south from Center-
field to Axtel where he was scheduled to speak in Sun-
day night meeting. He testified that from Centerfield to 
the point where t he accident occurred, he saw two auto-
mobiles. The first automobile was a· ton and a half 
truck. This was about a quarter of a mile south of 
Centerfield. After he had traveled another mile and a 
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half front where he passed the trurk, he passed a large 
passenger bus whirh \Vas proceeding- in the smne direc-
tion as the truck. Front the tinw he passed the bus until 
he arrived at the scene !Of the accident he passed no other 
automobile. It was about one half a 1nile frmn where he 
passed the bus to the scene of the accident. (R. 545) 
He then related the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the collision in front of Avery Beck's place. He was 
there when the ntilk truck subsequently ran into the two 
parked cars. In fact, he arrived at the scene of the 
accident before the plaintiff had ben removed from 
Maxine Anderson's car. (R. 546) (This witness's testi-
mony was very important as it showed conclusively that 
the only vehicle on the road which could have struck the 
Sorenson car, as alleged by the plaintiffs, was the bus 
which was within a half mile of the accident when 
Whitlock first saw it. The testimony is also important 
because it showed conclusively that the only truck which 
was 10n the road near the time of the collision, was a ton 
and a half truck which was one mile and a half in front of 
the bus when the bus was one half mile in front of the 
place where the plaintiff had been injured. Consequently 
this mysterious truck could not have played a part in the 
accident as the defendants repeatedly inferred, but did 
not prove.) 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR 
1. Counsel for the defendants committed revers-
ible error in questioning Rose Sorens1on on her failure 
to have a driver's license. (R. 122-3) 
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2. The court committed reversible error in per-
lnitting counsel for the defendants, over plaintiff's ob-
jection, to eontinue questioning Rose Sorenson ,on her 
failure to have a driver's license. (R. 122-3) 
3. Counsel for the defendants, Mr. Jones, commit-
ted reversible error in his argument to the jury wherein 
he stated and emphasized the immaterial fact that Rose 
Sorenson did not have a driver's license. (R. 558) 
4. The court eomn1itted reversible error in giving 
instruction No. 6.· 
5. The court committed reversible error in giving 
insruction No. 9. 
6. The court committed reversible error in giving 
instruction No. 10. 
7. The court committed reversible error 1n its 
failure to give instruction No. 3. 
8. The court committed reversible error in its fail-
ure to give instruction No. 4. 
9. The court commited reversible error in its fail-
ure to give instruction N1o. 5. 
10. The court committed reversible error in its fail-
ure to give instruction No. 6. 
11. The court committed rever.sible error 1n its 
failure to give instruction No. 7. 
12. The court committed reversible error in its fail-
ure to give instruction N1o. 8. 
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13. The court connnitted reversible error 1n its 
failure to give instruction No. 9. 
14. The court connnitted reversible error in is fail-
ure to give instruction No. 10. 
15. The court connnited reversible error in its fail-
ure to give instruction N~o. 11. 
16. The court connnited reversible error in its fail-
ure to instruct the jury as to the legal purport and sig-
nificance of the failure of Rose Sorenson to have a driv-
er's license at the time of the grievance complained of 
and set forth in plaintiff's con1plaint. 
PROPOSITION I. THE TESTIMONY INTRO-
DUCED BY DEFENDANTS OF ROSE SORENSON'S 
FAILURE TO HAVE A DRIVER'S LICENSE, AND 
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS DISCUSSION 
OF SUCH EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY CON-
STITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHICH DENIED 
TO THE DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL. 
In Specification of Error No. 1, 2, and 3 the appel-
lant has directed the court's attention to the record 
wherein the error complained of is indicated. At pages 
122 and 123 of the record the following questioning of 
Rose Sorens1on by defense counsel appears: 
Q How long have you ben driving a car~ 
A About two years. 
Q Why didn't you have a driver's license~ 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial, whether she has or has not. 
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THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q vVhy didn't you have a driver's license, Miss 
Sorenson~ 
all. 
A Well, I just hadn't went and torok one out is 
Q Ever tried to get one~ 
A No, sir. 
Q Afraid you couldn't~ 
A No, sir. 
Q Why didn't you have one then~ 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as unnecessary 
repition. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
A I will be perfectly frank with you. Our business 
is turkey business and I didn't take time off to go and get 
it, was practically the only reason. 
Q In two years time you never tried to get a li-
cense~ 
A No, sir. 
Q Afraid this nervousness you feel in driving a car 
would stop you from getting one~ 
A No. 
Q On this night you didn't have any right to be on 
the highway driving this car, did you~ 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial, calling for a conclusion of the 
witness. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
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Q You didn't have a license to drive that car that 
night~? 
A No, sir. 
On page 558, the record indicates some of the re-
marks n1ade by counsel for the defendants to the jury: 
MR. JONES: "Now let us cmne back to their inter-
est. \Vho told the plaintiff and Miss Anderson about the 
bus? \Vell, let us go back to that. Who ran into the 
Anderson car? The Sorenson car. vVhat car did the 
damage-the Sorenson car. \Vho was the one that told 
the occupants of the Anderson car about the bus~ The 
Sorensons, the ones who had actually done the damage. 
Well, if I were driving without a driver's license in these 
days I wouldn't want to be investigated either. If I 
smashed right into somebody else on the ~opposite side of 
the street, on the wrong side of the street, I wouldn't 
want to bear the load, if I could get out of it. 
So that night they don't tell, only Cleone said any-
thing about the bus. Of course, that is right, because 
the others told you they were dazed.'' 
In BERRY, AUTOMOBILES, 6th Edition, Volume 
I, Page 268, Sec. 304, the following general rule relating 
to this question is well stated as follows: 
''The operation of an automobile without a 
license, when one is required hy law, does not 
affect the rights of such person, nor of those 
riding with him, as travelers, nor bar their right 
of action or defense in personal injury actions; 
such persons not being rendered thereby tres-
passers upon the highway." 
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In 87 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, page 1471, 
the editors have reviewed to date the cases relating to 
the question here under discussion, and state the fol-
lowing: 
"The later cases are agreed that the fact that 
the operator of the 1notor vehicle had no opera-
tor's license, as required by statute, will not bar 
an action for injuries received, where this omis-
sion of duty had no casual connection with said 
injuries.'' 
In ZAGIER VS. SOUTHERN EXP. CO., 171 N.C. 
692; 89 S. E. 43, the court stated the above general rule 
as follows: 
''A collateral unlawful act not contributing to 
the injury will not bar a recovery." 
In PAGE VS. MAYORS, 191 Cal. 263; 216 Pac. 31 
it was held that in an action to recover dan1ages for a 
head on collision occurring upon a public highway be-
tween an automobile operated by defendant's agent and 
plaintiff's automobile, that the fact that plaintiff did not 
have an operator's license at the time of the collision 
did not make his presence on the highway unlawful, and 
did not deprive him of the right of r~covery, such omis-
sion having nothing to do with the ~accident. The court 
said: 
"With reference to the question of the oper-
ator's license, it is sufficient to say that it had 
nothing to do with the collision. We are not dis-
posed to hold that the presence of the plaintiff 
upon the highway was unlawful, and that this was 
thus a proximate cause of his injuries or to de-
prive him of the right of recov.ery. '' 
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In CLARK YS. DOOLITTLE 20G App. Div. 697; 
199 ~. Y. S. 814 the court held that the fact that the 
driver of plaintiff's aut:onwbile, "'ho at the tin1e \vas 
driving on an errand for the plaintiff, was an unlicensed 
driver, and was thus engaged in the violation of a statute 
requiring the licensing of operators or chauffeurs of 
nwtor vehicles, would not prevent the plaintiff from 
recovering for danmge to the car caused by the negligence 
,of defendant. The court said: 
''But a Inere violation of some prov1swn of 
the highway law, casual and not wilful, does not 
make the driver of an automobile a trespasser 
upon the highway, without civil rights, so that all 
others may abandon observance of the rules of the 
road and the p:vovisions of protective statutes 
in their relations to him. His right to recover, and 
the right of another by whom he is employed are 
not taken away because at the time of the injury 
he was disobeying a statute, which in no way con-
tributed to the injury." 
The foregoing cases and authorities correctly state 
the law. They do not simply represent a weight of author-
ity; there is no law that conflicts. If then the law clearly 
holds that failure to have a driver's license is iminaterial 
unless some causal connection is shown, what possible 
justification did counsel f,or the defendant have in in-
quiring of Rose Sorenson on cross examination about 
whether or not she had such a license? And what justi-
fication did counsel have in arguing the matter to the jury 
when the record clearly indicated that the failure to have 
a driver's license had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
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plaintiff's injuries? There could have been only one 
purpose, and that was to influence the jurors into be-
lieving that Rose Sorenson had no right upon the high-
way, and to thus lead the jury into believing that her un-
lawful failure to have a license was the cause of the 
accident. 
This errone·ously admitted evidence and argument 
was rendered n1ore harmful to the plaintiff by the fact 
that the court refused to instruct the jury that failure to 
have a driver's license was immaterial. Plaintiff re-
quested such an instruction in her requested instructions 
Nos. 9 and 11. The court refused both instructions and 
in fact failed to give any instruction on the question of 
whether 'O:r not failure to- have a driver's license was 
i1nmaterial or not. 
Plaintiffs have specified such refusal as error in 
specification of error Nos. 13, 15, and 16. The jurors 
were thus left to speculate upon a question upon which 
the law permits no speculation. Oounsel for the defend-
ants took full advantage of this situation in his argument 
to the jury and indicated by his remarks that failure to 
have the driver's license was the cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. We submit that such evidence and com-
ment constitutes reversible error, particularly in view 
of the fact that the court refused to instruct the jury 
on the law applicable to such evidence. 
PROPOSITION II. THE COURT ERRED IN 
LIMITING THE JURY TO THE QUESTION OF 
'VHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S BUS STRUCK 
THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY ROSE SOREN-
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SO~. ~-\ND ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT IF SAID BUS CROvVDED ROSE 
SORENSON'S CAR OFF Tl-IE ROAD AND THERE-
BY PROXIM_A_TELY CONTRIBUTED TO PLAI~­
TIFF'S !~JURIES THEN SAID BUS COMPANY 
"\VOULD BE LIABLE. 
The court refused t~o give plaintiff's requested in-
struction ~o. 7, and by the court's instructions Nos. 6, 
9, and 10 positively instructed the jurors that they must 
find that the defendant bus struck Rose Sorenson's car, 
and that if they found that it did not come in contact 
with said vehicle driven by Rose Sorenson, then they 
must find for the defendant. 
Thus, even though the jury may have found, as the 
evidence certainly justified, that the bus may have forced 
the Rose Sorenson car off of the road and rendered it 
thereby uncontrollable, such evidence under the court's 
instructions would not justify a finding in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
The only theory upon which the court could sustain 
such a limitation would be on the theory that plaintiff's 
proof must be strictly limited to the pleadings, and that 
evidence outside of an actual striking of the Sorenson 
car constituted a variance. 
vV e do not understand that such a strict interpreta-
tion is proper in a code state, where substantial justice is 
of more importance than a technician's rule of com1non 
law pleading. 
In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. 41, page 
554, Sec. 380 the following is written: 
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''The question of variance is in the absence 
of statutory provisions to the contrary, deter-
mined by the court from the ineoherence of the 
statements on their face and the inference which 
the court may be able to draw as to their effect 
upon the state of the party's preparation. A new 
principle of determination has been introduced 
by some codes. They prescribe that no variance 
between the allegation and proof shall be deemed 
material unless it misleads the adverse party to 
his prejudice in maintaining his action or de-
fense. But they do not leave it to the court, un-
aided by proof, to say that the variance is or is 
not material. On the contrary they require that 
it be shown by proof aliunde and to the satisfac-
tion of the CJourt that the alleged variance misled 
the complaining party to his prejudice. The bur-
den is upon the party complaining of the var-
iance to show that he has been misled." 
Defendant cannot possibly show that he has been 
misled by a theory which permits the jurors to find that 
defendants' bus crowded Rose Sorenson's car off the 
road so that the same became unmanageable and ran into 
the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. Can de-
fendants complain if the evidence fails to show all that 
plaintiffs allege and shows merely an actionable part of 
it~ 
Plaintiffs allege that the defendant bus came onto 
the wrong side of the road and struck the Sorenson car. 
There was practically undeniable evidence that the de-
fendant bus, traveling on a narrow country road, 
crowded the Sorenson car off of the highway onto the 
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wet and slipery shoulder of the road. The sharp issue 
arose on \Yhether or not the Sorenson car was struck 
by the bus. The jury Inay very well have concluded that 
the bus crowded the Sorenson car off of the road but 
failed to con1e in actual contact with it. This is action-
able negligence, and the jury under proper instructions 
should have been pennitted to so find. The court refused 
to so instruct. 
In UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943 Vol. 6 104-
14-1 it is provided as follows: 
''No variance betwen the allegations in a 
pleading and the proof is to be deemed rna terial, 
unless it has actually misled the adverse party to 
his prejudice in maintaining his action or de-
fense upon the merits. Whenever it appears that 
a party has been so misled, the court may order 
the pleading to be amended upon such terms as 
may be just.'' 
Under this liberal rule of construction the Utah 
courts have permited a defendant who alleged he was an 
owner of certain property t,o prove that he had simply 
a leasehold interest. OLSEN VS. TRIANGLE MIN. 
CO., 50 Utah 521; 167 Pac. 813 . 
. Certainly a plaintiff who has introduced competent 
evidence to the effect that a defendants' bus struck a 
third car while crowding it off the road, thus causing 
said third car to crash into the car in which plaintiff 
sustained injuries should not be precluded from recovery 
simply because the jury finds that the bus only crowded 
the third car off of the road, and did not actually strike 
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it. Such a plaintiff cannot consistently and effectively 
plead both that the bus struck the third car, and also 
that the bus failed to strike the car, but did succeed in 
crowding it off of the road. Plaintiffs allege their strong-
est ease. If their proof fails to substantiate all they 
allege but does prove actionable negligence which does 
not n1islead the defendant, plaintiff should be entitled 
t,o recover. 
CONCLUSION: 
The foregoing authorities clearly show the follow-
ing: 1. That all authorities agree and hold that evidence 
of failure to have a driver's license is immaterial unless 
there is son1e eausal connection between the failure to 
have the license, and the injuries complained of. Such a 
causal cop_nection is not shown, but is actually 
affirn1atively rebutted by all the evidence. In spite of this 
fact defendants introduced evidence of the failure to have 
such a license, and commented upon such failure in their 
argument to the jury. The error was rendered more 
grievous by the f,act that the court failed and refused 
to give plaintiff's corrective instructions, and failed to 
give any instructions which would correct the erroneous 
impression created and emphasized in the minds of the 
jurors. 2. The court erroneously instructed the jury 
that failure to prove that the defendants' bus actually 
struck the Rose Sorenson ear constituted failure to prove 
a case against the defendants. The jury was thus in-
structed that even though they may have found that the 
defendant bus crowded the Sorenson car off of the road 
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so that it beeame uneontrollable and caused the injuries 
eomplained of, still pl,aintiff could not recover. For these 
reasons we feel that plaintiff was denied a fair and im-
partial trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
:McCULLOUGH AND ASHTON 
HAROLD N. WILKINSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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